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The Impact of SFAS 133 on Income Smoothing by Banks through Loan Loss Provisions 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We examine the impact of SFAS 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging 
Activities, on the reporting behavior of commercial banks and the informativeness of their 
financial statements. We argue that because the stricter recognition and classification 
requirements of SFAS 133 reduced banks' ability to smooth income through derivatives, banks 
more affected by SFAS 133 will rely more on loan loss provisions to smooth income. We find 
evidence consistent with this argument. We also find that the increased reliance on loan loss 
provisions for smoothing income has impaired the informativeness of loan loss provisions. 
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The Impact of SFAS 133 on Income Smoothing by Banks through Loan Loss Provisions  
 
1. Introduction 
This study examines the impact of SFAS 133 (1998), Accounting for Derivative 
Instruments and Hedging Activities, on the reporting behavior of commercial banks and the 
informativeness of their financial statements.1 Barton (2001) and Pincus and Rajgopal (2002) 
document that hedging and reporting discretion are viewed as substitute mechanisms by firms to 
smooth income. Prior to SFAS 133, only trading derivatives were required to be marked to 
market and the relatively flexible criteria for classifying derivatives as hedging versus trading 
arguably allowed firms latitude in protecting the income statement from market volatility that 
might arise, for instance, from ineffective hedges (Ryan 2007; Ahmed et al. 2010). 
Consequently, firms did not have to resort to the use of reporting discretion in non-derivative 
items as much to achieve their smoothing objectives. 
SFAS 133 changed accounting for derivatives substantially by enforcing recognition of 
all derivative instruments at their fair values and imposing stricter criteria for a derivative to 
classify as a hedge. The intention of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in 
issuing this standard was presumably to increase the transparency of derivative positions and to 
ensure timely recognition/reporting of the associated gains and losses.  Clearly, these changes 
                                                 
1 Both SFAS 133 and SFAS 138, Accounting for Certain Derivative Instruments and Certain Hedging 
Activities - an amendment of SFAS 133, became effective for fiscal years beginning after June 15, 2000. 
In our discussions, we attribute the shift in reporting behavior and the market's response to earnings 
information to SFAS 133 because SFAS 133 is the paradigm-shifting standard, whereas SFAS 138 only 
made slight modifications to SFAS 133 such as allowing the risk of changes in a benchmark interest rate 
to be designated as the underlying risk in an interest-rate hedge. SFAS 149 (2003), Amendment of SFAS 
133 on Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, became effective for contracts entered into or 
modified after June 30, 2003, and for hedging relationships designated after June 30, 2003, and therefore 
was not effective during our main sample period. SFAS 149 made a number of very specific technical 
modifications, which are not likely to affect banks.  
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result in the income statement being more exposed to fluctuations in the fair values of 
derivatives. Indeed, the Bankers‟ Roundtable opposed the draft proposal of the standard in 1997 
by noting in a letter to the FASB that  
“…The draft proposes an unworkable framework that would introduce artificial 
and inappropriate volatility on the financial statements of corporations that safely 
use derivatives for hedging activities...” 
 
If true, SFAS 133 would effectively limit the ability of derivatives to smooth income.  
This raises at least two interesting research questions regarding the impact of SFAS 133 on the 
reporting behavior of managers, and the consequent impact on the informativeness of financial 
statements. In particular,  
1. Did firms using derivative instruments significantly alter their reporting behavior in 
the post-SFAS 133 era? 
2. Notwithstanding any changes in reporting behavior, by enacting SFAS 133, did the 
FASB achieve its intended purpose of making financial statements informationally 
more transparent to users? 
In this paper, we address these questions in the context of commercial banks. Derivative 
instruments present a natural way for banks to hedge exposures of their financial assets and 
liabilities to interest rate and exchange rate risks. Unlike non-financial firms, banks are extensive 
derivative users.2 Effective hedging allows commercial banks to report a smoother income 
stream over time, all else equal. Indeed, evidence indicates that bank managers, on average, 
exhibit a proclivity to smooth reported income, and often use their reporting discretion through 
loan loss provisions to do so (Wahlen 1994; Collins et al. 1995; Kanagaretnam et al. 2003, 2004; 
                                                 
2 Thus, by focusing on the banking industry, we allay concerns raised by Guay and Kothari (2003) about 
research focusing on non-financial firms whose derivative usage appears relatively modest.      
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Liu and Ryan 2006). More recently, Kanagaretnam et al. (2010) provide evidence that the extent 
of earnings management by banks through loan loss provisions is constrained by auditor 
independence.  
Under SFAS 133, derivatives that do not qualify as hedges must be re-classified as 
trading and marked to market, potentially increasing income volatility. We use two different 
measures to capture the extent to which banks are affected by the pronouncements of SFAS 133.3 
The first measure is the transitional unrealized holding gains (losses) that banks have to report 
separately as the “effect of adopting SFAS 133 on net income” in their FR Y-9C reports in the 
year of transition (i.e., 2001). Banks reporting such transitional gains or losses are clearly 
affected by the stricter classification criteria under SFAS 133. Therefore, we hypothesize that 
banks reporting non-zero transitional amounts rely more on loan loss provisions in the post-
SFAS 133 period to smooth income relative to banks that do not report such transitional 
amounts. The second measure, gains and losses from hedging ineffectiveness, relies on hand-
collected data on derivative use for hedging to construct a more direct measure of effective and 
ineffective use of derivatives for hedging purposes. We examine whether ineffective hedgers rely 
more on loan loss provisions to accomplish their smoothing objectives.  
Our results, using both the transitional gain/loss measure and the hedging effectiveness 
measure, indicate that banks more likely to  face increasing income statement volatility as a 
result of the adoption of SFAS 133 rely more on loan loss provisions to offset that volatility.  
These results demonstrate how the stricter recognition and classification requirements of SFAS 
133 impacted the discretionary accounting behavior of banks most affected by it. They indicate 
that the usefulness of derivatives for earnings management purposes documented in prior 
                                                 
3 It is important to note that banks that engage in extensive hedging and do so effectively need not 
necessarily be affected by the adoption of SFAS 133.  
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literature has diminished for such banks and forced them to rely more on discretionary accruals 
(loan loss provisions) in order to report smoother income streams.  
A question that naturally arises is whether the market is able to discern this shift in 
reporting behavior following the adoption of SFAS 133, i.e., whether there is a detectable shift in 
the market's response to earnings information from the pre-SFAS 133 era to the post-SFAS 133 
era. If the adoption of SFAS 133 has had the intended impact on earnings quality, we should 
observe a stronger relation between earnings (before loan loss provisions and taxes) and market 
returns. We would also expect the market to impound the increased use of discretion in loan loss 
provisions by some banks post-SFAS 133. Indeed, our results indicate that the association 
between loan loss provisions and market returns is significantly lower (in magnitude) in the post-
SFAS 133 period compared to the pre-SFAS 133 period, especially for banks that are more 
affected by SFAS 133 (as reflected by the two measures discussed earlier). This result suggests 
that increased use of loan loss provisions for smoothing income has impaired their 
informativeness from the market's perspective. However, we do not detect any statistically 
significant change in the relation between earnings (before provisions and taxes) and returns 
following the adoption of SFAS 133. Thus, we are unable to reject the null that SFAS 133 has 
not improved earnings quality following its adoption. 
Our results are robust to a number of sensitivity checks. For example, we use Heckman's 
two-stage procedure to control for potential self-selection bias and obtain qualitatively similar 
results to those reported above.  Our results are also robust to a variety of alternative model and 
sample period specifications. 
Although SFAS 133 is one of the most controversial standards issued by the FASB, 
research on the effects of SFAS 133 is limited to the Standard‟s effect on corporate risk 
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management behavior (Zhang 2009) and investor behavior (Ahmed et al. 2006; 2010). Our study 
adds to that literature in at least two important ways. First, it provides evidence on how SFAS 
133 affected reporting behavior, an issue unexamined by prior literature. It documents that, in the 
context of derivatives, bank managers use their reporting discretion over loan loss provisions to 
counteract the “undesirable” effects of SFAS 133‟s classification and fair value requirements.  
Second, prior evidence indicates that SFAS 133 altered the pricing of bank derivatives in 
equity markets (Ahmed et al. 2006) and bond markets (Ahmed et al. 2010). Our study adds to 
those findings by showing that, for banks, the effects of SFAS 133 go beyond derivatives. It 
documents that SFAS 133 also altered the information content of a non-derivative financial 
statement component (i.e., loan loss provisions) and the pricing of that component in equity 
markets.  
Even as FASB continues in its quest for improving transparency and representative 
faithfulness of financial statements through regulation, our analysis reaffirms the collective 
wisdom in the extant earnings management literature that managers would also continue to seek 
alternate avenues to achieve their reporting objectives. We believe that our findings are 
particularly timely given the recent exposure draft on accounting for financial instruments 
(FASB 2010), wherein FASB proposes to substantially expand the scope of fair value reporting 
to cover almost all financial instruments including commercial and consumer loans.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. We discuss institutional background and 
develop our hypotheses in Section II, describe the data, sample selection and research design in 
Section III, and present and discuss our results in Section IV. We provide some concluding 
remarks in Section V.  
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2. Background and Hypotheses 
Hedge accounting helps banks avoid earnings volatility and smooth their earnings by 
allowing them to change the timing of recognition of gains and losses on either the hedged item 
or the hedging derivative and recognize offsetting gains and losses concurrently in earnings. 
Unlike the earlier standards governing classification of and accounting for derivatives, SFAS 133 
imposes stringent criteria for derivatives to qualify for hedge accounting.  Derivatives that do not 
qualify for hedge accounting are classified as trading. Unlike most hedging derivatives, fair 
value changes of trading derivatives are recognized in the income statement as they occur. 
Therefore, income volatility can be significantly affected by whether derivatives are classified as 
hedging or as trading.  
Prior to SFAS 133, accounting for derivatives was guided by SFAS 52 (1981), Foreign 
Currency Translation, and SFAS 80 (1984), Accounting for Futures Contracts. In addition, 
Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) Issue No. 84-36 addressed the accounting for interest rate 
swaps and for some hedging activities not covered in either SFAS 52 or SFAS 80.  However, the 
accounting guidance for derivative instruments and hedging activities was incomplete (SFAS 
133, paragraph 235) and inconsistent (SFAS 133, paragraph 236).4 As a result, many derivative 
instruments were accounted for as hedging derivatives regardless of whether they were formally 
part of a hedging strategy (SFAS 133, paragraph 235). This lack of consistent and authoritative 
guidance allowed managers a great degree of discretion in the classification of derivatives, 
                                                 
4 Rane (1992), Montesi and Lucas (1996), Anson (1999), Gastineau et al. (2001) and SFAS 133 
(paragraphs 233-237) present detailed discussions of the inconsistencies between SFAS 52 and SFAS 80. 
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particularly derivatives not directly covered by these standards, for achieving their income 
management objectives.5 
 SFAS 133 substantially eliminates the discretion that bank managers previously had in 
classifying certain types of derivatives as hedges for accounting purposes. The discretion in 
classifying derivatives is reduced by SFAS 133 for at least three reasons. First, most macro 
(portfolio) hedging derivatives do not qualify for hedge accounting under SFAS 133 because 
there is no objective method for gauging their effectiveness in the absence of linkage to a single 
identifiable asset or liability (SFAS 133, paragraph 447).6 Second, some derivatives commonly 
used by banks in de facto hedging transactions do not qualify for hedge accounting under SFAS 
133. Such derivatives include hedges of interest rate risk in held-to-maturity securities (SFAS 
133, paragraphs 21(d) and 29(e)), hedges of long-term core deposits (SFAS 133, paragraphs 317 
and 437), and hedges of prepayment risks of financial assets or liabilities (SFAS 133, paragraph 
29(h)). Third, SFAS 133 places restrictions on the treatment of ineffective hedges. Hedge 
ineffectiveness implies that gains and losses from the hedged and the hedging items are not 
offsetting within an acceptable range. Previously, SFAS 52 specified no explicit level of 
correlation to assess hedge effectiveness and did not necessitate ongoing assessment of hedge 
effectiveness. In contrast, SFAS 80 required that value changes in the hedging and the hedged 
                                                 
5 For example, in response to the Exposure Draft for SFAS 133, the Hartford Financial Services Group 
indicates that accounting guidance for derivatives prior to SFAS 133 “requires users to interpret and 
develop their own accounting practices”. 
6 SFAS 133 significantly tightens the criteria for a portfolio of assets or liabilities to qualify for 
designation as a hedged item and makes implementing a macro hedge practically impossible (Gastineau e 
al. 2001). It requires that the individual components of the portfolio respond to a change in the relevant 
market risk factor almost identically, and requires that the value of each component responds similarly in 
direction and proportionately in amount to a change in the risk being hedged, such as market interest rate 
risk (SFAS 133, paragraph 447). An example included in SFAS 133 (paragraph 444) suggests that, when 
there is a change in the relevant market risk factor, the amounts of changes in the values of two 
components are considered to be proportionate if the amount of change in the value of one component is 
between 90 and 110 percent of the amount of change in the value of the other component. 
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items be highly and negatively correlated and called for an ongoing assessment of hedge 
effectiveness, but clearly permitted some room for judgment.7  Since the income effects of the 
ineffective portions of hedges were generally ignored under these accounting standards (Ryan 
2007), banks could potentially classify even ineffective (non-offsetting) derivatives as 
accounting hedges in order to reduce income volatility. SFAS 133 forces recognition in earnings 
of the ineffective portion of a hedge as it occurs, arguably increasing earnings volatility.8 
 Given these changes in accounting for derivatives, the income statement is arguably more 
exposed to unrealized gains and losses from derivatives that no longer qualify as hedges and 
from ineffective portions of derivatives that do qualify as hedges after SFAS 133. Faced with 
increased income volatility, banks relying on derivatives for hedging may have to look elsewhere 
to manage income patterns. In particular, if SFAS 133 makes it difficult for banks to engage in 
earnings management via derivative use, we should observe changes in the level of derivative 
usage and/or the use of loan loss provisions (hereafter LLP) for earnings management post 
SFAS133.9 We focus on income smoothing through LLP as this is the largest accrual for banks 
and prior research has documented that banks do use LLP for earnings management (Wahlen 
1994; Kanagaretnam et al. 2004; Liu and Ryan 2006; Kanagaretnam et al. 2010).  
  The extent to which these banks would seek alternate mechanisms for smoothing is likely 
a function of how much these banks are affected by SFAS 133. Banks that were more successful 
in their hedging activities, and whose derivative classifications are less likely to be affected by 
                                                 
7 High correlation under SFAS 80 is interpreted in practice as cumulative changes in the value of the 
hedging instrument being between 80 and 120 percent of the inverse cumulative changes in the value or 
the cash flows of the hedged item (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 1998). 
8 While SFAS 133 does not provide a specific hedge effectiveness threshold, practitioners interpret high 
effectiveness under SFAS 133 similar to the SEC‟s effectiveness interpretation under SFAS 80.  
9 Barton (2001) states, “Because earnings volatility is costly to both managers and their firms, SFAS 133 
may increase the costs of using derivatives vis-à-vis discretionary accruals. If managers view derivatives 
and discretionary accruals as substitute tools for smoothing earnings, then the imposition of SFAS 133 
could reduce hedging and increase earnings management.”    
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the new standard, would be less concerned about the standard's impact on income volatility. 
Consequently, we do not expect such banks to change their reporting discretion as much in the 
post-SFAS 133 period.  
 On the other hand, less successful hedgers could protect their income statements from 
volatility in the pre-SFAS 133 period by taking advantage of the less stringent hedge 
classification criteria, and by keeping unrealized gains and losses from ineffective hedging from 
affecting the income statement. These banks are more likely affected by the more stringent hedge 
classification criteria of SFAS 133 and, therefore, are more likely to change their reporting 
behavior following the adoption of this standard. 
 We use two alternate approaches to measure the extent to which banks might be affected 
by the adoption of SFAS 133. The first approach examines the transitional unrealized holding 
gains (losses) that banks have to report separately as the “the cumulative effect on net income of 
adopting SFAS 133” in their FR Y-9C reports in the year of transition (i.e., 2001).  As discussed 
earlier, SFAS 133 disallows hedge accounting for derivatives hedging certain risks associated 
with specific assets and liabilities. Examples include derivatives that hedge the interest rate risk 
in held-to-maturity securities and macro-hedge a portfolio of held-to-maturity securities. Since 
recognizing the hedging derivative at fair value but the hedged security at cost would create 
excessive income volatility, SFAS 133 allows banks to transfer such hedged securities to the 
trading or available-for-sale categories and derivatives hedging these securities to the trading 
category (SFAS 133, paragraph 54). The transition from cost-based to market-based reporting of 
such transferred securities following adoption of SFAS 133 results in a one-time reporting of 
unrealized holding gains (losses) which are reported as “the cumulative effect on net income of 
adopting SFAS 133”. Reclassifying such securities from held-to-maturity to trading or available-
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for-sale ensures that banks recognize offsetting gains and losses from the hedged items and 
hedging derivatives going forward because both positions are marked to market under the new 
standard.  On the other hand, marking both positions to market, as opposed to reporting them at 
cost as in the pre-SFAS 133 period, significantly reduces banks‟ ability to shield earnings from 
ineffectiveness in such hedges. Given that banks reporting such transitional gains or losses are 
clearly affected by the stricter classification criteria under SFAS 133, we posit the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1A: The pre- to post-SFAS 133 change in income smoothing through 
loan loss provisions is greater for banks reporting a non-zero transitional amount 
(reclassifying banks) than for banks reporting a zero transitional amount (non-
reclassifying banks). 
  
 The second approach employs a more direct measure of effective and ineffective use of 
derivatives for hedging purposes. SFAS 133 requires firms to identify the extent to which 
derivative instruments are effective at offsetting the price fluctuations of the underlying. Unlike 
earlier standards, SFAS 133 mandates recognition of gains or losses from the ineffective portion 
of hedging instruments in the income statement. As noted by Ryan (2007), making hedge 
ineffectiveness more apparent than under prior accounting standards is the strongest feature of 
SFAS 133. We manually search the post-SFAS 133 10-K filings to identify banks that report 
gains or losses due to hedging ineffectiveness.  We refer to banks with such gains or losses as 
ineffective hedgers and banks without no such gains or losses as effective hedgers. The income of 
banks that are ineffective hedgers will be relatively more affected by SFAS 133 than the income 
of banks that are effective hedgers.  Accordingly, we examine the following hypothesis regarding 
whether less effective hedgers turn more to loan loss provisions for accomplishing their 
smoothing objectives: 
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Hypothesis 1B: The pre- to post-SFAS 133 change in income smoothing through 
loan loss provisions is greater for banks that are less effective at hedging 
(ineffective hedgers) than for banks that are more effective at hedging (effective 
hedgers). 
 
 It is plausible that hedging behavior itself might change following adoption of SFAS 133. 
In particular, less effective hedgers are likely to have a stronger incentive to design more 
effective hedges. Using a sample of nonfinancial firms, Zhang (2009) finds empirical evidence in 
support of this notion.  However, if the banks in our study were successful in doing so, then we 
would not expect to reject Hypothesis 1A or 1B. In other words, such a change in hedging 
behavior will bias against finding support for these hypotheses. 
 Next, we turn to the question of the impact of SFAS 133 on the informativeness of 
financial statements. Given the broad goals of standard-setting, the purpose of any standard, 
SFAS 133 included, is to enhance the informativeness of financial statements. However, critics 
argued that the standard would introduce „artificial volatility‟ in financial statements and 
diminish their usefulness in assessing the financial condition of a firm.  For instance, in a letter to 
the FASB, Bankers Roundtable (1997) claims:     
“…The requirement that derivative instruments be reported at fair value is 
fundamentally problematic.  As many observers have already noted, the result 
would introduce artificial volatility into financial statements. This would have a 
deleterious effect for market participants attempting to determine the institutions‟ 
true financial condition…” 
While proponents of SFAS 133 did not deny the potential for this increased volatility in 
financial statements, they argued that such increases would merely reflect economic reality that 
the prior standards governing derivative disclosures failed to capture (Smith et al. 1998):   
“…The new requirements do not create volatility but only unmask it. It requires 
the reporting of volatility that always existed, but was not reported…”  
 
Naturally, FASB subscribes to this latter view (SFAS 133, paragraphs 224-228). If 
forcing the recognition of unrealized gains and losses resulting from marking to market all 
 
 
13 
derivative instruments makes income a better measure of performance during the fiscal period, 
then we should find a stronger association between income before taxes and loan loss provisions 
(i.e., exclusive of any exercised reporting discretion but inclusive of these gains and losses) and 
market returns over the period. This should especially be the case for firms reporting non-zero 
transitional amounts (i.e., reclassifying banks) and banks that are relatively ineffective at hedging 
(i.e., ineffective hedgers). If, on the other hand, the concerns raised by critics were to be true and 
the increase in income volatility resulting from the inclusion of these losses and gains only adds 
noise to the performance measures, one could perhaps argue that such an association might 
actually be weaker. Thus, we test the following admittedly refutable hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2A: The pre- to post-SFAS 133 increase in informativeness of 
earnings (before taxes and loan loss provisions) is greater for banks reporting a 
non-zero transitional amount (reclassifying banks) than for banks reporting a 
zero transitional amount (non-reclassifying banks). 
 
Hypothesis 2B: The pre- to post-SFAS 133 increase in informativeness of 
earnings (before taxes and loan loss provisions) is greater for banks that are less 
effective at hedging (ineffective hedgers) than for banks that are more effective at 
hedging (effective hedgers). 
 
 Moreover, if Hypotheses 1A and/or 1B receive empirical support, i.e., banks reporting 
non-zero transitional amounts and/or banks that are relatively ineffective at hedging resort more 
to loan loss provisions for smoothing in the post-SFAS 133 period, then we should expect a 
reduction in the perceived informativeness of loan loss provisions, leading us to the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3A: The pre- to post-SFAS 133 reduction in informativeness of loan 
loss provisions is greater for banks reporting a non-zero transitional amount 
(reclassifying banks) than for banks reporting a zero transitional amount (non-
reclassifying banks). 
 
Hypothesis 3B: The pre- to post-SFAS 133 reduction in informativeness of loan 
loss provisions is greater for banks that are less effective at hedging (ineffective 
hedgers) than for banks that are more effective at hedging (effective hedgers). 
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3. Data, Sample Selection, and Research Design 
3.1 Data and Sample Selection 
 We obtain bank holding company financial data and derivative data from 10-K filings 
and FR Y-9C filings. We obtain share price data from the CRSP data files. We restrict our pre-
SFAS 133 sample to fiscal years 1999 and 2000, and post-SFAS 133 sample to fiscal years 2001 
and 2002 in order to better focus on the changes occurring around the enactment of SFAS 133 
and avoid possible contamination from other events.10   
Table 1 summarizes the sample selection criteria.  Of the 2,283 banks with complete data 
for the sample period, only 448 use derivatives. We exclude an additional 250 banks that are 
privately held and 79 banks that were subject to acquisitions prior to the implementation of 
SFAS 133, leaving us with a final sample of 119 banks.  This sample includes 235 bank-year 
observations from the pre-SFAS 133 period and 237 observations from the post-SFAS 133 
period.11 All sample banks have December 31 fiscal year ends.  
As noted earlier, we use two approaches to measure the extent to which banks are 
affected by SFAS 133. The first approach classifies banks as reclassifying if they report 
transitional unrealized gains or losses due to adopting SFAS 133 in their FR Y-9C reports in the 
year of transition (i.e., 2001) and non-reclassifying if they do not report any transitional amount.  
Of the 119 sample banks, 55 are classified as reclassifying and 64 as non-reclassifying. The 
second approach classifies banks as ineffective hedgers if they report gains or losses due to 
hedging ineffectiveness in the income statement, and as effective hedgers if they do not report 
                                                 
10 As discussed in the Robustness Checks section, we also test our hypotheses over an expanded sample 
period, which includes the period 1996-2006. 
11 We are missing 3 bank-year observations in the pre- and 1 bank-year observation in the post-SFAS 133 
period due to missing price data in the CRSP files. 
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such gains or losses. Of the 119 sample banks, 41 are classified as ineffective hedgers and 78 as 
effective hedgers.  A total of 23 banks that are ineffective hedgers are also reclassifying banks. 
3.2 Research Design 
We compare the propensity to smooth income through loan loss provisions and the 
informativeness of loan loss provisions and earnings before taxes and provisions in the pre- and 
post-SFAS 133 periods for banks that are differentially affected by SFAS 133. Following prior 
literature (Kanagaretnam et al. 2004; Liu and Ryan 2006), we estimate smoothing propensity as 
the coefficient relating loan loss provisions (LLP) to earnings before taxes and provisions 
(EBTP) after controlling for differences in the amount of loans, type of loans, nonperforming 
loans, capital ratio and size.  
Hypotheses 1A and 1B predict that, because SFAS 133 may have reduced the ability to 
smooth income through hedging and increased income volatility, banks affected by SFAS 133 
are likely to rely more on LLP for smoothing income following SFAS 133. In contrast, banks not 
affected by SFAS 133 will exhibit a relatively smaller change in smoothing income through LLP 
following SFAS 133. As discussed earlier, we use two approaches to measure the extent to 
which banks are affected by SFAS 133. The first approach partitions sample banks into 
reclassifying banks/non-reclassifying banks, and the second approach classifies sample banks 
into effective hedgers/ineffective hedgers. We estimate separate regressions for the affected and 
unaffected banks because we hypothesize that the change in smoothing propensity from the pre- 
to the post-SFAS 133 period differs across affected and unaffected banks. We estimate the 
following model to test Hypotheses 1A and 1B: 
itititit
tiittitittit
SIZECAPLOAN
LOANNPLNPLEBTPPOSTEBTPPOSTLLP
it



 
987
1,651,43210 *         (1a) 
where, for bank i and year t, 
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LLPit  =   Loan loss provisions scaled by beginning total assets; 
POSTit   =  An indicator variable which equals 1 if the observation belongs to the post-
SFAS 133 period, and 0 otherwise; 
EBTPit   =   Earnings before taxes and provisions scaled by beginning total assets; 
NPLi,t-1  =   Beginning nonperforming loans scaled by beginning total assets; 
NPLit   =   Change in nonperforming loans scaled by beginning total assets; 
LOANi,t-1  =   Beginning total loans outstanding scaled by beginning total assets; 
LOANit  =   Change in total loans outstanding scaled by beginning total assets; 
CAPit  =   Tier I risk-based capital ratio; 
SIZEit  =   Natural logarithm of total assets. 
  
 The coefficient relating LLP to EBTP in Model (1a) measures the extent of income 
smoothing through loan loss provisions. To smooth income, banks increase the level of LLP 
when EBTP is high and reduce the level of LLP when EBTP is low. Consequently, a positive 
coefficient on EBTP reflects smoothing via LLP. The coefficient on the interaction term 
POST*EBTP represents the difference in income smoothing coefficients between pre- and post-
SFAS 133 periods. Following prior studies (Wahlen 1994; Kim and Kross 1998; Ahmed et al. 
1999; Kanagaretnam et al. 2004; Liu and Ryan 2006; Kanagaretnam et al. 2010), we use LOAN, 
LOAN, NPL and NPL to control for the nondiscretionary component of loan loss provisions. 
The size of the loan portfolio relative to total assets (LOAN) varies across banks, and banks with 
more assets in the form of loans at the beginning of the period are expected to have higher LLP. 
Also, LLP may be positively or negatively related to the change in the amount of loans during 
the year (LOAN) depending on the level of default risk associated with incremental loans. 
Because higher levels of beginning nonperforming loans and change in nonperforming loans 
during the current period will require a higher provision in the current period, we expect NPL 
and NPL to be positively related to LLP.  Model (1a) also includes Tier I regulatory capital 
(CAP) as a control variable.  As Ahmed et al. (1999) find evidence consistent with banks using 
loan loss provisions to raise their capital ratio, we expect a negative relation between LLP and 
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CAP. Following Kim and Kross (1998), we include bank size (SIZE) as an additional control 
variable.  
As discussed in Liu and Ryan (1995), provisions for homogeneous loans, which are small 
and infrequently renegotiated, are based on statistical analyses or historical data at the portfolio 
level, whereas provisions for heterogeneous loans, which are large and frequently renegotiated, 
are based on judgment on a loan-by-loan basis.12 Because banks have differential ability to 
exercise discretion over provisions for homogeneous and heterogeneous loans, the composition 
of the loan portfolio, in addition to its size, likely affects LLP.  Consequently, we also test 
Hypothesis 1 using the following model that allows the relation between LLP and each 
component of the loan portfolio (i.e., homogeneous and heterogeneous loans) to differ: 
itititittiit
tiittitittit
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9871,67
1,651,43210 *
       
(1b) 
where, for bank i and year t,  
HMGLOANi,t-1 =   Beginning homogeneous loans outstanding scaled by beginning total assets;  
HMGLOANit  =   Change in homogeneous loans outstanding scaled by beginning total assets;  
HTRLOANi,t-1  =   Beginning heterogeneous loans outstanding scaled by beginning total assets;  
HTRLOANit  =   Change in heterogeneous loans outstanding scaled by beginning total assets. 
  
 We categorize a bank as reclassifying (RC) if it reports transitional unrealized gains or 
losses from adopting SFAS 133 in its FR Y-9C reports in 2001, the year of transition. Given the 
higher income volatility introduced by SFAS 133, the use of loan loss provisions to smooth post-
SFAS 133 income is likely to be higher for reclassifying banks.  The interaction coefficients 
represent the difference in smoothing propensity between pre- and post-SFAS 133 periods. 
                                                 
12 As in Liu and Ryan (2006), homogeneous loans include consumer loans (credit card loans, auto loans, 
student loans etc.), 1-4 family residential mortgages, loans to financial institutions, and acceptances of 
other banks. Heterogeneous loans include commercial and industrial loans, direct lease financing, all 
other real estate loans, agriculture loans and foreign loans.  
 
 
18 
Accordingly, we test Hypothesis 1A by testing whether RC3 and
RC
3 , the interaction coefficients 
for reclassifying banks, are greater than NRC3 and
NRC
3 , the corresponding interaction 
coefficients for non-reclassifying banks. 
 We classify banks according to the extent (lack) of hedging effectiveness to test 
Hypothesis 1B. A bank is classified as ineffective if it reports derivative gains or losses due to 
hedging ineffectiveness in the post-SFAS 133 period.  Banks that are ineffective hedgers (IEH) 
likely have higher income volatility following SFAS 133 than banks that are effective hedgers 
(EH).  If ineffective hedgers increase their dependence on loan loss provisions to moderate this 
higher volatility, we expect IEH3 and
IEH
3 , the coefficients on the interaction terms in Models 
(1a) and (1b) for ineffective hedgers, to be more positive than EH3 and
EH
3 , the corresponding 
interaction coefficients for effective hedgers. 
 Hypotheses 2 and 3 investigate the impact of SFAS 133 on the informativeness of 
earnings (before taxes and loan loss provisions) and loan loss provisions. We estimate the 
following model to test these hypotheses:  
it
MVE
it
MVE
it
MVE
itt
MVE
it
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itt
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ittit
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76
53 ** 4210       (2) 
R is annual equity return measured from April 1 of year t to March 31 of year t+1 (note 
that all banks in our sample have December 31 fiscal year ends).  The binary variable POST 
equals 1 for post-SFAS 133 years and 0 otherwise.  As the potential change in informativeness of 
earnings is likely more pronounced for banks that are likely to be more affected by SFAS 133, 
we estimate Model (2) after partitioning our sample into reclassifying banks/non-reclassifying 
banks and effective hedgers/ineffective hedgers.  All continuous independent variables in Model 
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(2) are deflated by beginning market value of equity. Following Liu and Ryan (1995) and Beaver 
et al. (1997), we include change in nonperforming loans (NPL) and loan charge-offs (LCO) to 
control for the nondiscretionary portion of the loan loss provisions. 
 Hypothesis 2A (2B) examines whether the pre- to post-SFAS 133 change in 
informativeness of EBTP is greater for reclassifying (ineffective hedger) banks than for non-
reclassifying (effective hedger) banks. If SFAS 133 improved EBTP as a measure of performance 
by forcing banks to recognize unrealized gains and losses from changes in market value of 
derivatives, then the coefficient on EBTP should increase post-SFAS 133. In addition, this 
increase should be greater for reclassifying than for non-reclassifying banks (Hypothesis 2A) and 
for banks with ineffective hedges than for banks with effective hedges (Hypothesis 2B). 
Accordingly, as argued by its proponents, if SFAS 133 leads income to be a better measure of 
firm performance, 3  should be positive and significant. Alternatively, if SFAS 133 introduces 
artificial volatility in earnings, as argued by its opponents, then EBTP may not be more 
informative or may be less informative after SFAS 133 and we would fail to reject Hypotheses 
2A and 2B. We test these hypotheses by testing whether the coefficient RC3 (
IEH
3 ), which 
reflects the change in informativeness of EBTP following SFAS 133 for reclassifying (ineffective 
hedger) banks, is greater than NRC3 (
EH
3 ), the corresponding coefficient for non-reclassifying 
(effective hedger) banks.   
 Hypothesis 3A (3B) examines whether the pre- to post-SFAS 133 reduction in 
informativeness of LLP is greater for reclassifying (ineffective hedger) banks than for non-
reclassifying (effective hedger) banks. Consistent with investors viewing LLP as an expense (Liu 
and Ryan 1995; Ahmed et al. 1999), we expect the coefficient on LLP to be negative. If SFAS 
133 leads to more income smoothing through LLP, then the coefficient on LLP should be less 
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negative post-SFAS 133. In addition, this change in the coefficient on LLP should be greater for 
reclassifying than for non-reclassifying banks (Hypothesis 3A), and for banks with ineffective 
hedges than for banks with effective hedges (Hypothesis 3B). We test these hypotheses by testing 
whether the coefficient 5 , which reflects the change in  informativeness of LLP following 
SFAS 133, is greater for reclassifying than for non-reclassifying banks, and for ineffective than 
for effective hedgers, i.e., whether )( 55
IEHRC  is greater than )( 55
EHNRC  . 
4. Results 
4.1 Univariate Comparisons and Correlations 
 We report descriptive statistics for the variables used in Models (1) and (2) in Table 2. 
Panels A and B present descriptive statistics for partitioning based on reclassifying and non-
reclassifying banks and on ineffective and effective hedging, respectively. The mean loan loss 
provisions scaled by beginning value of assets varies from 0.2% to 0.3% and is consistent with 
prior research. Over our sample period, the average earnings before taxes and provisions scaled 
by beginning value of assets is around 2%. Taken together, this implies that the magnitude of 
loan loss provisions is between 10% and 15% of earnings, and indicates that it is a significant 
component of earnings for banks. Mean annual returns range between 8.5% and 10.2%.  
Nonperforming loans average 0.4% of total assets.  The descriptive statistics also indicate that 
loans account for approximately two-thirds of total assets on average.  While the average bank 
holds more homogenous loans relative to heterogeneous loans in its portfolio, the distributions of 
HMGLOAN and HTRLOAN vary widely, suggesting that banks specialize in each type of loan.  
The mean Tier I capital ratio is nearly 8%, indicating that the average bank is well-capitalized.13   
                                                 
13 The minimum level of primary capital to total assets established by the Federal Reserve System is 5.5% 
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 Untabulated correlations between the variables used in Models (1) and (2) for 
reclassifying/non-reclassifying banks and for effective hedgers/ineffective hedgers provide 
preliminary evidence of income smoothing through LLP. As expected, LLP and EBTP are 
significantly positively related for each sub-group in both the pre- and the post-SFAS 133 
periods. In the pre-SFAS 133 period, the correlation between LLP and EBTP for reclassifying 
banks is 0.287 (p < 0.001), and the corresponding correlation for non-reclassifying banks is 
0.265 (p < 0.001). In the post-SFAS 133 period, the correlation between LLP and EBTP for 
reclassifying banks is 0.312 (p < 0.001), and the corresponding correlation for non-reclassifying 
banks is 0.272 (p < 0.001).   
As for ineffective hedgers, the correlation between LLP and EBTP in the pre-SFAS 133 
period is 0.274 (p < 0.001). The corresponding correlation for effective hedger banks is 0.288 (p-
value < 0.001). In the post-SFAS 133 period, the correlation between LLP and EBTP for 
ineffective hedger banks is 0.324 (p < 0.001). The corresponding correlation for non-
reclassifying banks is 0.282 (p-value < 0.001).  The results also indicate a strong positive 
correlation between RETURN and EBTP across all subsamples.14   
4.2 Income Smoothing through LLP in the Pre- and Post-SFAS 133 Periods 
 Hypothesis 1A examines the extent of income smoothing through LLP conditional on the 
effect of SFAS 133 on banks‟ hedging activities. Banks more likely to be affected by SFAS 133 
will rely more on LLP for income smoothing following SFAS 133.15 Panel A of Table 3 reports 
estimation results for Models (1a) and (1b) which estimate income smoothing in the pre- and the 
                                                 
14 The correlation between RETURN and EBTP ranges from 0.388 to 0.431 depending on the sub-group 
of banks. 
 
15 Following Barton (2001) and Pincus and Rajgopal (2002), we also test whether banks use LLP and 
derivatives as partial substitutes in income smoothing. Consistent with the findings of these two studies, 
we find that banks that are high users of derivatives smooth less through LLP than banks that are low 
users of derivatives.  
 
 
22 
post-SFAS 133 periods for reclassifying and non-reclassifying banks, i.e., banks that reported 
and did not report a nonzero transitional gain or loss from adopting SFAS 133 in 2001. The 
coefficient on EBTP for reclassifying banks is positive and significant (p < 0.039 and p < 0.012 
in Models (1a) and (1b), respectively) in the pre-SFAS 133 period indicating that reclassifying 
banks smooth income through loan loss provisions during this period. More importantly, 
reclassifying banks rely more on loan loss provisions for smoothing income in the post-SFAS 
133 period as evidenced by the significant positive coefficients on POST*EBTP (p < 0.021 and p 
< 0.030 in Models (1a) and (1b), respectively).  
By contrast, while non-reclassifying banks rely on loan loss provisions for smoothing 
income in the pre-SFAS 133 period (the coefficient on EBTP is positive and significant for both 
models), they do not increase their reliance on loan loss provisions for smoothing income post-
SFAS 133. This is indicated by the coefficient on POST*EBTP which is not significantly 
different from zero (p < 0.783 and p < 0.552 for Models (1a) and (1b), respectively). To test 
Hypothesis 1A, we test the difference between the coefficients on POST*EBTP for reclassifying 
and non-reclassifying banks. The results of this test, presented in Panel B of Table 3, indicate 
that the pre- to post-SFAS 133 change in income smoothing through loan loss provisions is 
significantly greater for reclassifying than for non-reclassifying banks (p < 0.021 and p < 0.062 
for Models (1a) and (1b), respectively).  In other words, reclassifying banks rely more on loan 
loss provisions for smoothing income following SFAS 133 than do non-reclassifying banks.   
 Hypothesis 1B tests the extent of income smoothing through LLP conditional on the 
effectiveness of banks‟ hedging activities following SFAS 133. Banks that report gains or losses 
due to ineffective hedging activities are more likely to have higher income volatility and, 
consequently, to rely more on LLP for income smoothing following SFAS 133. Panel A of Table 
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4 reports estimation results for Models (1a) and (1b) which estimate income smoothing in the 
pre- and the post-SFAS 133 periods for ineffective hedgers and effective hedgers, i.e., banks that 
reported and did not report gains or losses due to hedge ineffectiveness following SFAS 133. As 
expected, both ineffective hedgers and effective hedgers smooth income through LLP in the pre-
SFAS 133 period. The coefficient on EBTP is significantly positive for both groups of banks and 
for both models. The results also show that ineffective hedgers increase their reliance on LLP for 
smoothing income in the post-SFAS 133 period as evidenced by the significant positive 
coefficients on POST*EBTP (p < 0.004 and p < 0.016 for Models (1a) and (1b), respectively). 
By contrast, the coefficient on POST*EBTP is not significantly different from zero for ineffective 
hedgers (p < 0.373 and p < 0.362 for Models (1a) and (1b), respectively) indicating no greater 
reliance on LLP for smoothing income post-SFAS 133. We test Hypothesis 1B by testing the 
difference between the coefficients on POST*EBTP for ineffective hedgers and effective hedgers. 
The results of this test, presented in Panel B of Table 4, indicate that the pre- to post-SFAS 133 
change in income smoothing through loan loss provisions is significantly greater for ineffective 
hedgers than for effective hedgers (p < 0.001 and p < 0.070 for Models (2a) and (2b), 
respectively).  This indicates that ineffective hedgers rely more on LLP for smoothing income in 
the post-SFAS 133 period than do effective hedgers.  
The signs of the coefficients on the control variables in Models (1a) and (1b) as presented 
in Tables 3 and 4 are consistent with prior research. Both NPL and ΔNPL are significantly 
positively related to LLP, indicating that banks with higher nonperforming loans have higher 
loan loss provisions. The coefficient on LOAN in Model (1a) is positive as expected, consistent 
with prior research (e.g., Wahlen 1994; Kim and Kross 1998; Kanagaretnam et al. 2004). The 
positive association between LLP and LOAN indicates that banks with more assets in the form of 
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loans have higher loan loss provisions. When the loan portfolio is decomposed into 
homogeneous and heterogeneous loans in Model (1b), the coefficients on HMGLOAN and 
HTRLOAN are positive as expected. Also, unreported statistical tests indicate that the relation of 
LLP with HTRLOAN is weaker than the corresponding relation with HMGLOAN. This is 
consistent with heterogeneous loans being subject to more discretion (Liu and Ryan 1995; 2006). 
While the coefficient signs on CAP and SIZE are consistent with prior studies, they are not 
statistically significant across all specifications.  
 Taken together, our results support the conjecture that because SFAS 133 limited banks‟ 
ability to use derivatives for income smoothing purposes by limiting certain derivatives from 
being classified as hedging and/or making hedge ineffectiveness more visible, affected banks 
reacted to this constraint by increasing their reliance on loan loss provisions to achieve smooth 
income. 
4.3 Informativeness of EBTP and LLP in the Pre- and Post-SFAS 133 Periods 
 Hypotheses 2A and 2B examine changes in the informativeness of EBTP following 
SFAS 133 conditional on the effect of SFAS 133 on banks‟ hedging activities. If recognition of 
unrealized gains and losses as required by SFAS 133 improves the quality of reported income, 
then EBTP should be more strongly related to bank returns following SFAS 133, especially for 
reclassifying banks and for banks that are ineffective hedgers. Alternatively, if recognition of 
previously unrecognized gains and losses induces artificial income volatility (noise), the relation 
between bank returns and EBTP may be attenuated following SFAS 133.  
 We estimate Model (2) to test these hypotheses and report the results for the 
reclassifying/non-reclassifying partitioning in Panel A of Table 5 and for the ineffective 
hedgers/effective hedgers partitioning in Panel B of Table 5. The coefficients on POST*EBTP in 
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Panel A are insignificant for the reclassifying and non-reclassifying bank subsamples (p < 0.177 
and p < 0.287, respectively), as are the coefficients on POST*EBTP in Panel B for the ineffective 
hedgers and effective hedgers subsamples (p < 0.405 and p < 0.367, respectively). In addition, as 
reported in Panel C of Table 5, the coefficient on POST*EBTP for reclassifying banks is not 
significantly different from the corresponding coefficient for non-reclassifying banks (p < 
0.402). Similarly, the coefficient on POST*EBTP for ineffective hedgers is not significantly 
different from the corresponding coefficient for effective hedgers (p < 0.253). Accordingly, we 
fail to reject Hypothesis 2A or 2B and find no evidence to suggest that SFAS 133 improved the 
informativeness of EBTP. 
 Our tests of Hypotheses 1A and 1B indicate greater reliance on loan loss provisions for 
smoothing income following SFAS 133 for reclassifying banks than for non-reclassifying banks, 
and for ineffective hedgers than for effective hedgers. Increased use of LLP for income 
smoothing should reduce its perceived informativeness.  Hypotheses 3A and 3B test whether the 
post-SFAS 133 informativeness of LLP is reduced more for reclassifying banks than for non-
reclassifying banks and for ineffective hedgers than for effective hedgers.  The results in Panels A 
and B of Table 5 are consistent with these hypotheses. The coefficient on POST*LLP for 
reclassifying banks in Panel A is positive and significant (p < 0.011), indicating a reduction in 
informativeness of LLP (i.e., LLP is less negatively related to returns after SFAS 133) for 
reclassifying banks following implementation of SFAS 133. By contrast, we do not observe a 
significant reduction in informativeness of LLP for non-reclassifying banks (p < 0.325).  The 
results reported in Panel B, indicate a significant (p < 0.022) reduction in informativeness of LLP 
for ineffective hedgers following implementation of SFAS 133 but no significant (p < 0.346) 
reduction for effective hedgers.  In addition, as reported in Panel C of Table 5, the coefficient on 
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POST*LLP for reclassifying banks is significantly greater than the corresponding coefficient for 
non-reclassifying banks (p < 0.009). Similarly, the coefficient on POST*LLP for ineffective 
hedgers is significantly grater than the corresponding coefficient for effective hedgers (p < 
0.023).  
Collectively, these results suggest that although SFAS 133 did not significantly alter the 
informativeness of earnings before taxes and provisions, it significantly reduced the 
informativeness of loan loss provisions for banks that are more affected by the standard.  If 
enhancing the informativeness of financial statements is a broad goal of any accounting standard, 
these results question whether SFAS 133 met that goal.  While the standard may have increased 
the disclosure relating to derivatives usage, it does not appear to have had a positive effect on the 
value relevance of aggregate income measures.   
4.4 Robustness Checks 
4.4.1 Control for Self-Selection 
Endogeneity induced by self-selection bias is a concern in much of derivatives research 
because users (heavy users) of derivatives are likely to systematically differ from non-users 
(sporadic users) (Barton 2001; Pincus and Rajgopal 2002).  However this is unlikely to be a 
major concern in our study due to the difference-in-differences approach adopted in our research 
design.  That is, we analyze changes in the coefficients of interest within a partition from the pre- 
to the post-SFAS 133 period and the comparative magnitude of such changes across partitions.  
If the implementation of SFAS 133 is assumed to be an exogenous shock our results cannot be 
attributed to self-selection issues. Nevertheless, we adopt Heckman‟s two stage approach to 
correct for (any) self-selection. 
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Finance theory suggests that the probability of financial distress (Smith and Stulz 1985), 
the level of risk faced by a bank and the costs of managing that risk (Géczy et al. 1997), CEO 
risk-taking incentives (Tufano 1996; Rogers 2002), and tax incentives (Nance et al. 1993; Dolde 
1995; Mian 1996) affect the decision to use derivatives. Consequently, we conjecture that 
derivative use is positively related to bank size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), interest rate risk (GAP), 
nonperforming loans (NPL), liquidity (LIQUIDITY) and tax convexity (CONVEXITY), and 
negatively related to net interest margin (NIM) and managerial incentives to take risk 
(INCENTIVE). We specify our first-stage probit model as follows: 
itit
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where, for bank i at time t, USER is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank holds derivatives, 
and 0 otherwise. GAP, a measure of interest rate risk, serves as an exclusion restriction in our 
two-stage estimation procedure because, while both finance theory and empirical evidence 
suggest a direct link between maturity gap and derivative usage, it is unlikely that GAP and LLP 
are directly linked because the former is a measure of market risk, whereas the latter is driven by 
credit risk.  Imposing an exclusion restriction in the Heckman procedure is critical because the 
absence of such a restriction can lead to severe multicollinearity problems in the second stage 
estimation (Francis and Lennox 2008). The two-stage estimation procedure yields results that are 
qualitatively similar (untabulated) to our primary results. The results of the probit model indicate 
that banks systematically differ when categorized based on the decision to use derivatives or not. 
They are generally in line with the conjectures of risk management theory and the findings of 
prior empirical studies. The sample period is 1999-2002. The model is based on 713 publicly-
traded banks, 198 of which are derivative-users. 79 of these derivative-user banks are acquired 
prior to SFAS 133 and therefore excluded from the analyses. The tests are based on 11,038 bank-
 
 
28 
quarters. 1,876 of these observations belong to banks with derivatives, whereas 9,162 
observations belong to banks with no derivatives. Banks with higher probability of financial 
distress and riskier balance sheet composition (LEV), higher interest rate risk exposure (GAP), 
lower net interest income (NIM), higher credit risk (NPL), larger asset portfolio (SIZE), executive 
compensation plans with weaker incentives to take risk (INCENTIVE) and facing convex tax 
functions (CONVEXITY) are more likely to use derivatives. The coefficient on GAP, the 
exclusion restriction, is positive and significant at conventional levels (p < 0.001). The model 
correctly classifies 83.4 percent of user banks and 87.8 of non-user banks. Overall, 87.1 percent 
of observations are classified correctly whereas a naive model that classifies all banks as a user 
(non-user) would correctly classify 17.0 (83.0) percent of total observations. 
4.4.2 Alternative Model Specifications 
Our results also remain robust to various alternative model specifications.  For example, 
our inferences are unaltered when the variables in Models (1a), (1b) and (2) are scaled by 
alternative scalars including beginning total loans (as in Liu and Ryan 2006), average loans 
outstanding (as in Ahmed et al. 1999), or beginning book value of equity (as in Kanagaretnam et 
al. 2004).  
We also test Hypotheses 1A and 1B using the model employed by Liu and Ryan (2006), 
where control variables include only CAP and NPL. In addition, we use the beginning 
allowance for loan losses (ALL) as an additional control variable as in Wahlen (1994). Our 
results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
4.4.3 Alternative Sample and Measurement Periods 
SFAS 119, Disclosure about Derivative Financial Instruments and Fair Value of 
Financial Instruments, became fully effective for fiscal years ending after December 15, 1995. 
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This statement required comprehensive derivative disclosures, thus making detailed derivative 
data available in 1996 fiscal year filings. Expanding the window over which we conduct the tests 
to include the period 1996 to 2006 does not alter any of our inferences.16  
Our estimates of Model (2), which are used to test the informativeness of EBTP and LLP 
in the pre- and post-SFAS 133 periods, use annual returns measured from April to March. To 
examine the sensitivity of our results to the return measurement window, we re-estimate Model 
(2), using calendar year returns. Our findings regarding Hypotheses 3A and 3B are not robust to 
this alternative return window. We do not find a statistically significant pre- to post-SFAS 133 
reduction in the coefficient on LLP for both reclassifying and ineffective hedger banks.  
However, we note that association between calendar year returns and financial statement 
components may be weaker as December year-end banks report their annual financials during 
the first quarter of the following year. Therefore, market reactions to information contained in 
these annual reports will not be captured in calendar year return windows.  
 
5. Conclusion 
SFAS 133 has been one of the most intensely debated accounting standards in recent 
times. Proponents of the standard welcomed it as a comprehensive approach to reporting risk 
management activities, addressing concerns about incompleteness, inconsistencies and 
ambiguities of prior standards.   On the other hand SFAS 133 came under heavy criticism from 
the industry, which argued that the new rules would introduce artificial volatility to financial 
reports. Given prior findings that derivatives and accruals are used as partial substitutes in 
managing reported earnings (Barton 2001; Pincus and Rajgopal 2002), this paper investigates 
                                                 
16 We exclude periods beyond 2006 to avoid possible contamination from the effects of the subprime 
crisis. 
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how the more stringent hedge accounting rules of SFAS 133 impacted the earnings management 
behavior and the value relevance of earnings and loan loss provisions of commercial banks. 
Using a sample of US bank holding companies over the period of 1999-2002, we find 
that banks which are likely to be most impacted by SFAS 133 have increased their reliance on 
loan loss provisions for income smoothing following its adoption.  We also find that subsequent 
to SFAS 133, informativeness of loan loss provisions have deteriorated for such banks.  We do 
not find evidence of SFAS 133 affecting the informativeness of earnings before provisions and 
taxes for bank holding companies. Our results highlight how changes in disclosure regulation 
impact discretionary accounting behavior of firms in an unintended manner. Assuming 
increasing informativeness of aggregate financial disclosures is a broad goal of any accounting 
standard; our empirical results question whether SFAS 133 was successful in doing so. 
Future research can examine other implications of the increased emphasis on LLP for 
smoothing after SFAS 133, such as on analyst forecast properties. Whether analysts' forecasts 
incorporate the increased use of LLP for smoothing is a potentially interesting research question.  
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection Criteria 
 
 
 No. of Banks No. of Observations 
Bank holding companies with no missing data in FR 
Y9-C files during the 1999-2002 period 
2,283 7,391 
Less: Derivative non-user banks 1,835 6,271 
Derivative user banks 448 1,120 
Less: Derivative user banks with no return data 250 533 
Publicly traded derivative user banks  198 587 
Less: Banks acquired prior to SFAS 133 79 115 
Publicly traded derivative user banks with both pre- 
and post-SFAS 133 data 
 
119 
 
472 
Pre-SFAS 133 (1999 and 2000) data sample 119 235 
Post-SFAS 133 (2001 and 2002) data sample 119 237 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Regression Variables 
 
Panel A: Reclassifying and Non-reclassifying (in italics) Derivative User Banks 
 
 
Mean Minimum 
Lower  
Quartile 
Median 
Upper  
Quartile 
Maximum 
LLP 0.0032 0.0000 0.0014 0.0027 0.0043 0.0155 
 0.0028 0.0000 0.0010 0.0022 0.0037 0.0419 
R 0.0854 -0.4838 -0.1180 0.0675 0.2764 0.7260 
 0.1018 -0.5692 -0.1021 0.0884 0.2872 1.2777 
EBTP 0.0226 -0.0111 0.0181 0.0225 0.0265 0.0553 
 0.0221 -0.0191 0.0175 0.0218 0.0272 0.0591 
NPL 0.0049 0.0000 0.0022 0.0039 0.0058 0.0277 
 0.0039 0.0000 0.0016 0.0031 0.0048 0.0474 
NPL 0.0004 -0.0166 -0.0006 0.0003 0.0013 0.0174 
 0.0004 -0.0077 -0.0006 0.0001 0.0011 0.0358 
LOAN 0.6451 0.1805 0.5825 0.6524 0.7219 0.8892 
 0.6242 0.0121 0.5837 0.6647 0.7108 0.8705 
LOAN 0.0332 -0.0594 0.0119 0.0375 0.0705 0.0995 
 0.0341 -0.0441 0.0131 0.0380 0.0636 0.0845 
HMGLOAN 0.3825 0.0120 0.3060 0.3886 0.4854 0.8390 
 0.3732 0.0000 0.3189 0.3973 0.5074 0.7310 
HMGLOAN 0.0245 -0.0489 0.0028 0.0268 0.0506 0.0830 
 0.0295 -0.0222 0.0040 0.0282 0.0558 0.0772 
HTRLOAN 0.2627 0.0023 0.2109 0.2750 0.3811 0.8036 
 0.2511 0.0000 0.1638 0.2568 0.3734 0.8539 
HTRLOAN 0.0197 -0.0469 -0.0029 0.0181 0.0425 0.0671 
 0.0220 -0.0393 -0.0001 0.0218 0.0543 0.0597 
CAP 0.0770 0.0423 0.0672 0.0747 0.0831 0.1490 
 0.0777 0.0444 0.0669 0.0770 0.0880 0.1756 
SIZE 24.2826 19.1263 21.9013 23.0815 24.4170 27.2845 
 24.2745 19.1574 21.1080 22.5792 23.7283 28.0120 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Definitions: LLP = loan loss provisions scaled by beginning total assets; R = annual return from April 1st to 
March 31st; EBTP = earnings before taxes and provisions scaled by beginning total assets; NPL = beginning 
nonperforming loans scaled by beginning total assets; NPL = change in nonperforming loans scaled by beginning 
total assets; LOAN = beginning total loans outstanding scaled by beginning total assets; LOAN = change in total 
loans outstanding scaled by beginning total assets; HMGLOAN = beginning homogeneous loans outstanding scaled 
by beginning total assets; HMGLOAN = change in homogeneous loans outstanding scaled by beginning total 
assets; HTRLOAN = beginning heterogeneous loans outstanding scaled by beginning total assets; HTRLOAN = 
change in heterogeneous loans outstanding scaled by beginning total assets; CAP = Tier I risk-based capital ratio; 
SIZE = Natural logarithm of total assets. 
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TABLE 2 (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics for Regression Variables 
 
Panel B: Ineffective and Effective (in italics) Hedger Banks 
 
 
Mean Minimum 
Lower  
Quartile 
Median 
Upper  
Quartile 
Maximum 
LLP 0.0030 0.0000 0.0012 0.0026 0.0042 0.0290 
 0.0029 0.0000 0.0011 0.0023 0.0036 0.0419 
R 0.0937 -0.5692 -0.1076 0.0877 0.2046 0.8570 
 0.0982 -0.4483 -0.0789 0.0949 0.3344 1.2777 
EBTP 0.0235 -0.0191 0.0193 0.0231 0.0275 0.0591 
 0.0213 -0.0128 0.0165 0.0209 0.0259 0.0553 
NPL 0.0044 0.0000 0.0023 0.0034 0.0051 0.0277 
 0.0041 0.0000 0.0015 0.0033 0.0055 0.0474 
NPL 0.0003 -0.0155 -0.0005 0.0001 0.0011 0.0152 
 0.0004 -0.0166 -0.0007 0.0001 0.0012 0.0358 
LOAN 0.6203 0.0121 0.5723 0.6661 0.7185 0.8690 
 0.6410 0.2809 0.5881 0.6566 0.7104 0.8892 
LOAN 0.0329 -0.0594 0.0177 0.0342 0.0593 0.0866 
 0.0346 -0.0374 0.0149 0.0329 0.0539 0.0995 
HMGLOAN 0.3698 0.0000 0.2993 0.3846 0.4775 0.7140 
 0.3673 0.0421 0.3256 0.3597 0.5257 0.8390 
HMGLOAN 0.0280 -0.0489 0.0088 0.0273 0.0518 0.0830 
 0.0295 -0.0222 0.0040 0.0282 0.0558 0.0772 
HTRLOAN 0.2506 0.0000 0.2001 0.2669 0.3868 0.8539 
 0.2737 0.0011 0.1604 0.2628 0.3661 0.8443 
HTRLOAN 0.0209 -0.0327 -0.0008 0.0203 0.0565 0.0597 
 0.0214 -0.0469 -0.0004 0.0202 0.0562 0.0671 
CAP 0.0739 0.0439 0.0649 0.0718 0.0804 0.1235 
 0.0803 0.0423 0.0704 0.0793 0.0899 0.1756 
SIZE 24.9687 20.5113 22.7919 24.0660 25.0161 28.0120 
 22.5572 19.1263 20.6244 21.6059 22.9064 24.9326 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Definitions: LLP = loan loss provisions scaled by beginning total assets; R = annual return from April 1st to 
March 31st; EBTP = earnings before taxes and provisions scaled by beginning total assets; NPL = beginning 
nonperforming loans scaled by beginning total assets; NPL = change in nonperforming loans scaled by beginning 
total assets; LOAN = beginning total loans outstanding scaled by beginning total assets; LOAN = change in total 
loans outstanding scaled by beginning total assets; HMGLOAN = beginning homogeneous loans outstanding scaled 
by beginning total assets; HMGLOAN = change in homogeneous loans outstanding scaled by beginning total 
assets; HTRLOAN = beginning heterogeneous loans outstanding scaled by beginning total assets; HTRLOAN = 
change in heterogeneous loans outstanding scaled by beginning total assets; CAP = Tier I risk-based capital ratio; 
SIZE = Natural logarithm of total assets. 
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TABLE 3 
Income Smoothing Behavior of Banks before and after SFAS 133 
  
Panel A: Reclassifying vs. Non-reclassifying Banks 
itit
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Panel B: Tests of Hypothesis 1A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1) The reclassifying bank sample consists of 217 bank-year observations (for 55 banks) from 1999 to 2002.   
2) The non-reclassifying sample consists of 255 bank-year observations (for 64 banks) from 1999 to 2002.   
3) All results are based on standard errors clustered simultaneously by bank and by year. All p-values are based on 
two-tailed t-tests.  
4) Variable Definitions: LLP = loan loss provisions scaled by beginning total assets; POST = 1 if the observation 
belongs to the post-SFAS 133 period, and 0 otherwise; EBTP = earnings before taxes and provisions scaled by 
beginning total assets; NPL = beginning nonperforming loans scaled by beginning total assets; NPL = change in 
nonperforming loans scaled by beginning total assets; LOAN = beginning total loans outstanding scaled by 
beginning total assets; LOAN = change in total loans outstanding scaled by beginning total assets; HMGLOAN = 
beginning homogeneous loans outstanding scaled by beginning total assets; HMGLOAN = change in homogeneous 
loans outstanding scaled by beginning total assets; HTRLOAN = beginning heterogeneous loans outstanding scaled 
by beginning total assets; HTRLOAN = change in heterogeneous loans outstanding scaled by beginning total 
assets; CAP = Tier I risk-based capital ratio; SIZE = Natural logarithm of total assets. 
 Reclassifying (RC) Banks1 Non-reclassifying (NRC) Banks2 
 Model (1a) Model (1b) Model (1a) Model (1b) 
 Coefficient  
P-value 
Coefficient  
P-value 
Coefficient  
P-value 
 Coefficient  
P-value   Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
Intercept -0.0072 0.0405 -0.0009 0.8014 -0.0034 0.1168 -0.001 0.6323 
POST -0.0003 0.8490 0.0006 0.6336 -0.0014 0.4645 -0.0015 0.5878 
EBTP 0.0897 0.0386 0.1001 0.0123 0.1015 0.0118 0.1226 0.0008 
POST*EBTP 0.0256 0.0213 0.0263 0.0300 0.0089 0.7833 0.0109 0.5522 
NPL 0.3581 <.0001 0.2947 <.0001 0.3407 <.0001 0.3926 <.0001 
NPL 0.3584 <.0001 0.3502 <.0001 0.4843 <.0001 0.4105 <.0001 
LOAN 0.0024 0.0205   0.0018 0.0632     
LOAN -0.0007 0.7657   0.0056 0.0029     
HMGLOAN   0.0038 0.0354     0.0034 <.0001 
HMGLOAN   -0.0055 0.0881     0.0087 0.0013 
HTRLOAN   0.0018 0.0277     0.0013 0.0504 
HTRLOAN   0.0040 0.1898     0.0023 0.3740 
CAP -0.0200 0.2115 -0.0146 0.3308 -0.0371 0.6154 -0.0337 0.5964 
SIZE 0.0003 0.0883 0.0001 0.1181 0.0002 0.0715 0.0001 0.2177 
F-Value 10.12 <.0001 10.15 <.0001 17.69 <.0001 19.11 <.0001 
Adj. R-Sq. 0.508  0.517  0.497   0.515   
 Model (1a) P-value Model (1b) P-value 
Hypothesis 1A NRCRC 33    0.0214 
NRCRC
33    0.0619 
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TABLE 4 
Income Smoothing Behavior of Banks before and after SFAS 133 
 
Panel A: Ineffective vs. Effective Banks 
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Panel B: Tests of Hypothesis 1B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1) The ineffective hedger sample consists of 162 bank-year observations (for 41 banks) from 1999 to 2002.   
2) The effective hedger sample consists of 310 bank-year observations (for 78 banks) from 1999 to 2002.   
3) All results are based on standard errors clustered simultaneously by bank and by year. All p-values are based on 
two-tailed t-tests. 
4) Variable Definitions: LLP = loan loss provisions scaled by beginning total assets; POST = 1 if the observation 
belongs to the post-SFAS 133 period, and 0 otherwise; EBTP = earnings before taxes and provisions scaled by 
beginning total assets; NPL = beginning nonperforming loans scaled by beginning total assets; NPL = change in 
nonperforming loans scaled by beginning total assets; LOAN = beginning total loans outstanding scaled by 
beginning total assets; LOAN = change in total loans outstanding scaled by beginning total assets; HMGLOAN = 
beginning homogeneous loans outstanding scaled by beginning total assets; HMGLOAN = change in homogeneous 
loans outstanding scaled by beginning total assets; HTRLOAN = beginning heterogeneous loans outstanding scaled 
by beginning total assets; HTRLOAN = change in heterogeneous loans outstanding scaled by beginning total 
assets; CAP = Tier I risk-based capital ratio; SIZE = Natural logarithm of total assets. 
 Ineffective Hedger (IEH) Banks1 Effective Hedger (EH) Banks2 
 Model (1a) Model (1b) Model (1a) Model (1b) 
 Coefficient  
P-value 
Coefficient  
P-value 
Coefficient  
P-value 
 Coefficient  
P-value   Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
Intercept -0.0056 0.0839 0.0030 0.4003 -0.0020 0.3311 0.0001 0.9627 
POST 0.0017 0.1493 0.0015 0.1777 -0.0004 0.6362 -0.0005 0.4846 
EBTP 0.0852 0.0478 0.0783 0.0324 0.1207 0.0283 0.1089 0.0421 
POST*EBTP 0.0320 0.0041 0.0289 0.0156 0.0115 0.3730 0.0200 0.3617 
NPL 0.2178 0.0001 0.2183 <.0001 0.4134 <.0001 0.4077 <.0001 
NPL 0.5082 <.0001 0.4169 <.0001 0.3269 <.0001 0.3132 <.0001 
LOAN 0.0049 0.0001   0.0030 0.0119   
LOAN -0.0088 0.0271   -0.0018 0.4057   
HMGLOAN   0.0067 <.0001   0.0034 0.0054 
HMGLOAN   -0.0122 0.0048   -0.0046 0.0947 
HTRLOAN   0.0019 0.1760   0.0022 0.0018 
HTRLOAN   0.0026 0.6158   -0.0005 0.8003 
CAP -0.0312 0.0703 -0.0563 0.0010 -0.0394 0.0983 -0.0247 0.1401 
SIZE 0.0003 0.0608 -0.0001 0.1353 0.0002 0.1130 0.0001 0.1012 
F-Value 15.07 <.0001 15.48 <.0001 17.13 <.0001 19.83 <.0001 
Adj. R-Sq. 0.479  0.536  0.505  0.518  
 Model (1a) P-value Model (1b) P-value 
Hypothesis 1B EHIEH 33    0.001 
EHIEH
33    0.0700 
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 TABLE 5 
The Association between Returns and Earnings Components before and after SFAS 133  
Panel A: Reclassifying vs. Non-reclassifying Banks 
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Panel B: Ineffective vs. Effective Banks 
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Panel C: Tests of Hypotheses 2A, 2B, 3A and 3B 
 
 
 
 
1) The reclassifying bank sample consists of 217 bank-year observations (for 55 banks) from 1999 to 2002.   
2) The non-reclassifying sample consists of 255 bank-year observations (for 64 banks) from 1999 to 2002.   
3) The ineffective hedger sample consists of 162 bank-year observations (for 41 banks) from 1999 to 2002.   
4) The effective hedger sample consists of 310 bank-year observations (for 78 banks) from 1999 to 2002.   
5) All results are based on standard errors clustered simultaneously by bank and by year. All p-values are based on 
two-tailed t-tests.  
6) Variable Definitions: RETURN = annual return from April 1st to March 31st; POST = 1 if the observations belongs 
to the post-SFAS No. 133 period, and 0 otherwise; EBTPMVE = earnings before taxes and provisions scaled by 
beginning market value of equity; LLPMVE = loan loss provisions scaled by beginning market value of equity; 
NPLMVE = change in nonperforming loans scaled by beginning market value of equity; LCOMVE = loan charge-offs 
scaled by beginning market value of equity.  
 Reclassifying (RC) Banks1 Non-reclassifying (RC) Banks2 
 
 Coefficient  
Estimate 
P-value 
 Coefficient  
Estimate 
P-value 
Intercept -0.0486   0.0023 -0.0824 0.0002 
POST -0.0205 0.0089 -0.0311 0.0111 
EBTPMVE 2.1219   0.0010 2.3931  <.0001 
POST* EBTPMVE -0.1804   0.1765 -0.1335  0.2872 
LLPMVE -1.8248   0.0077 -1.6600 0.0009 
POST*LLPMVE 0.2562   0.0108 -0.1318 0.3245 
NPLMVE
 
-0.7503 0.0300 -1.0291 0.0001 
LCOMVE -1.6130 0.0211 -0.8881 0.0554 
F-Value 42.22 <.0001 48.33 <.0001 
Adj. R-Sq. 0.392  0.357  
 Ineffective Hedger (IEH) Banks3 Effective Hedger (EH) Banks4 
 
 Coefficient  
Estimate 
P-value 
 Coefficient  
Estimate 
P-value 
Intercept -0.0259 0.0010 -0.0591 0.0001 
POST -0.0100 0.0037 -0.0202 0.0319 
EBTPMVE 2.2864 <.0001 2.1198 <.0001 
POST* EBTPMVE -0.1022 0.4050 -0.1604 0.3667 
LLPMVE -2.0027 0.0322 -1.8091 0.0005 
POST*LLPMVE 0.3925 0.0224 0.0841 0.3462 
NPLMVE -1.3647 0.0001 -0.9628 0.1152 
LCOMVE -1.2503 0.0717 -0.6577 0.0001 
F-Value 32.23 <.0001 27.41 <.0001 
Adj. R-Sq. 0.342    0.318  
 Model (2) P-value  Model (2) P-value 
Hypothesis 2A NRCRC 33    0.4019 Hypothesis 3A 
NRCRC
55    0.0092 
Hypothesis 2B EHIEH 33    0.2525 Hypothesis 3B 
EHIEH
55    0.0232 
